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The Butz Stops Here: Why the Food Movement Needs 
to Rethink Agricultural History 
 
Nathan A. Rosenberg? & Bryce Wilson Stucki** 
 
After Donald Trump’s surprise victory over Hillary 
Clinton, commentators and journalists turned their attention to 
rural America, where Trump won three times as many votes as 
his opponent, in order to understand what had just happened.1 
They wrote about forgotten places: small towns populated by 
opioid addicts,2 dying Rust Belt cities with abandoned factories 
at their centers,3 and mountain hamlets populated by 
xenophobes and racists.4 These writers described a conservatism 
so total and inexplicable it seemed part of the landscape. 
 
Yet the history of rural America reveals a different story. 
From the 1890s to the 1930s, rural Americans played a vital role 
in radical leftist politics.5 Over the decades, some of those 
 
        ?     Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Arkansas School of Law. 
       **    Mathmatical Statistician at the United States Census Bureau. The authors wish to 
thank Kael Bowling, Austin Bryniarski, Pete Daniel, Graham Downey, Carol Guensburg, 
Jane Hayashi, Christopher Kelley, Kiley Reid, Charles Rosenberg, Susan Rosenberg, and 
Susan Schneider for their comments and critiques. 
1.  Helena Bottemiller Evich, Revenge of the Rural Voter, POLITICO (Nov. 13, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/hillary-clinton-rural-voters-trump-231266. 
2.  E.g., Zoë Carpenter, Did the Opioid Epidemic Help Trump Win?, THE NATION 
(Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/did-the-opioid-epidemic-help-donald 
trump-win/. 
3.  E.g., Brian Mann, Rural America Supported Trump, But Will His Policies Support 
Them?, NPR (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/06/512037502/rural-america 
supported-trump-but-will-his-policies-support-them. 
4.  E.g., Kevin Baker, Bluexit: A Modest Proposal for Separating Blue States from 
Red, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: FACT TANK (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/140948/bluexit-blue-states-exit-trump-red-america. 
5.  See generally, e.g., JIM BISSETT, AGRARIAN SOCIALISM IN AMERICA (Red River 
Books ed. 2002) (analyzing the farmer-fueled rise of the most electorally successful 
Socialist organization in the nation); David Brody, On the Failure of U.S. Radical Politics: 
A Farmer-Labor Analysis, 22  INDUS. REL. 141 (1983) (contending that the farmer-labor 
alliance played a central role in early 20th Century radical politics); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, 
DEMOCRATIC PROMISE (1976) (arguing that the Populist movement was an agrarian revolt 
against the corporate state); Eric Foner, Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?, 
17 HIST. WORKSHOP 53, 71 (1984) (explaining that the Socialist party’s strength in the 
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people chose to leave, but more of them were driven out due to 
policy—agricultural policy, in particular. Republicans and 
Democrats, alike, have supported laws that favor corporate 
agriculture, which continue to drive small farmers out of 
business and depopulate the countryside. While specialists know 
this history well, the public tends to know a folk history, written 
by figures associated with contemporary food movements. 
 
This folk history rests on several key myths, which cover 
different periods of modern history from the New Deal to the 
present. We challenge these myths, not to attack particular 
authors or engage in pedantry, but to reveal the causes and 
extent of the suffering endured by rural families in the 
20th century, which in turn, decimated the populist left. A 
reconsideration of the history of agricultural policy will help 
food-system reformers develop a more radical—and more 
effective—vision for rural America. 
 
Myth: The New Deal Was for Small Farmers 
 
A number of writers in the folk-history tradition have 
interpreted New Deal farm bills and the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act—the era’s signature law—as designed to help small-scale 
farmers and the poor, with the unintended consequence of 
inaugurating our current crop-subsidy system. New Deal farm 
“programs were specifically tailored to assist sharecroppers and 
the rural poor,” writes Daniel Imhoff;6 “the 1933 Farm Bill was 
designed to save small farming in America,” writes Bill 
Eubanks;7 “small landholders,” writes Marion Nestle, “grew 
 
United States was rooted in an “unusual amalgam” of constituencies, including small 
farmers, rather than in factory workers). Although Marxists sometimes dismissed farmers 
as members of the petit bourgeois, socialist organizations in the United States were 
generally more ideologically flexible, in no small part due to the activism of farmers. As 
Harrison George put it to fellow Communists in 1932, “The impoverished farmers are on 
the march. We cannot order them to retreat, even if we desired.” Harrison George, Causes 
and Meaning of the Farmers’ Strike and Our Tasks as Communists, 11 THE COMMUNIST 
918, 931 (1932). 
6.  DANIEL IMHOFF, FOOD FIGHT: THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE NEXT FARM BILL 
40 (2d ed. 2012). 
7.  William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation 
and Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 217 
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dependent on support programs . . . and began to view them as 
entitlements.”8 
 
While crop subsidies were an important part of the New 
Deal, these writers misrepresent the class politics that decided 
FDR’s agricultural agenda. Historians and economists have 
reached an overwhelming consensus that the New Deal farm 
bills were designed to aid large farmers and succeeded in doing 
so: The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) 
“accelerated the increasing concentration of land,” writes Pete 
Daniel. “Obviously, large landowners reaped most of the federal 
money.”9 An aide to Henry Wallace, then the secretary of 
agriculture, later said the AAA was “militantly for the larger 
farmers.”10 Those farmers benefitted tremendously: government 
payments increased from 3 percent of net farm income in 1929 
to 31 percent by 194011 and farmers’ incomes doubled in the 
1930s.12 These funds went mostly to large-scale operations.13 
 
Meanwhile, farmers, tenants, and sharecroppers were 
“shoved aside in the rush toward bigger units, more tractors, and 
less men per acre.”14 From 1930 to 1950, the number of farmers 
declined by 14 percent, with a 37 percent decline for black 
farmers.15 Between 1930 and 1945, white tenants and croppers 
declined by 37 percent and black tenants and croppers by 32 
percent.16 More catastrophic losses were to follow, as the 
government remained “militantly for the larger farmers” on 
through the present. 
 
(2009). 
8.  Marion Nestle, Utopian Dream: A New Farm Bill, DISSENT, Spring 2012, at 15. 
9.  PETE DANIEL, BREAKING THE LAND 170 (1985). 
10.  Id. at 105. 
11.  E.C. PASOUR, JR., AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE 77 tbl.7.1 (1990). 
12.  KATHYRN S. OLMSTED, RIGHT OUT OF CALIFORNIA 29 (2015). 
13.  See, e.g., DANIEL, supra note 9, at 170-173; GILBERT FITE, COTTON FIELDS NO 
MORE 139 (1984); CHARLES KENNETH ROBERTS, THE FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
AND RURAL REHABILITATION IN THE SOUTH ix, 29 (2015). 
14.  Farm Security Administration official John H. Caufield quoted in ROBERTS, 
supra note 13, at xx, discussing conditions in Texas. 
15.  BRUCE J. REYNOLDS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RURAL BUS. COOP. SERV., RBS 
RES. REP. 194, BLACK FARMERS IN AMERICA, 1865-2000 24 tbl.3 (2015). 
16.  GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH 245 (1997). 
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Myth: Black Farmers Left the South to Find Better 
Jobs 
 
Most accounts treat black migration out of the South after 
the New Deal as a voluntary and profitable move. “Millions of 
poor farmers,” writes Robert Paarlberg in Food Politics, “left 
the land [to take] higher paying jobs in urban industry.”17 The 
legal scholar Jim Chen called this migration a “liberating 
moment” that allowed rural black Southerners to escape to the 
urban north, away from “the dreariness of their former lives on 
the farm.”18 He concluded, “[t]he jobs were there, the wages 
were better, and black America was ready to move.”19 
 
In reality, historians have established that white Southern 
leaders encouraged mechanization and co-opted policy in order 
to pressure blacks to leave. With the backing of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), large farmers cut costs and 
drove small farmers out of business, while local USDA agents 
discriminated against black farmers on a systematic basis: by 
1920, there were 925,000 black farmers, and by 1970, 90 
percent of them were gone.20 Some of these farmers left for 
better opportunities, but more were forced out in one of the 
“largest government-impelled population movements in all our 
history.”21 When they reached the cities, they entered a white-
dominated society where they were treated as inferiors,22 and 
“an economy that had relatively little use for them,”23 with black 
unemployment rates between 10 and 15 percent “as early as 
 
17.  ROBERT PAARLBERG, FOOD POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 102 
(2d ed. 2013). 
18.  Jim Chen, Of Agriculture’s First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 
1261, 1303-1305 (1995). 
19.  Id. at 1305. 
20.  PETE DANIEL, DISPOSSESSION 6 (2013). 
21.  Donald H. Grubbs, Lessons of the New Deal, in THE PEOPLE’S LAND 19, 20 
(Peter Barnes ed. 1975). 
22.  See, e.g., JASON SOKOL, ALL EYERS ARE UPON US (2014); KAREN R. MILLER, 
MANAGING INEQUALITY (2014). 
23.  WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 247. 
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1950”24 and “up to 30 percent,” in several major cities, a decade 
later.25 
As the civil rights movement gathered steam, assaults on 
black farmers intensified. By the 1950s, “any program for small, 
poverty-ridden farmers in the South became entangled with the 
civil rights movement.”26 The founder of the Citizens’ Council 
drew up a plan to remove 200,000 African-Americans from 
Mississippi by 1966 through “the tractor, the mechanical cotton 
picker . . . and the decline of the small independent farmers.”27 
As government-funded mechanization continued apace, “tens of 
thousands” of poor farmers were forced out of agriculture: they 
eked out an existence in the hinterlands, in shacks, without 
“food or adequate medical care.”28 Black farmers who held onto 
their land used their independence to support civil rights 
workers, which often made them targets for lynch mobs and 
local elites.29 Throughout the South, USDA agents withheld 
loans black farmers needed to operate—amid other 
discrimination—which continued after the Civil Rights Act.30 
From 1959 to 1969, black farmers declined by over two thirds, 
almost triple the rate of white farmers.31 The story of black 
 
24.  Id. at 246. 
25.  Michael Munk, Revolution on the Farm, 14 MONTHLY REV. 538, 547 (1963). 
26.  FITE, supra note 13, at 218. 
27.  BAYARD RUSTIN, Fear in the Delta, in TIME ON TWO CROSSES: THE 
COLLECTED WRITINGS OF BAYARD RUSTIN 66, 74 (Devon W. Carbado & Donald Weise 
eds., 2015). 
28.  FITE, supra note 13, at 219. 
29.  See, e.g., AKINYELE OMOWALE UMOJA, WE WILL SHOOT BACK 59-63, 73-76, 
99-105, 160 (2013). When Bob Moses, a Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) leader, began his first voting drives in Mississippi, he stayed with E.W. Steptoe, a 
landowner in Amite County. Steptoe was the local NAACP chapter president and secured 
Moses space to teach voter registration classes in a one-room church. According to 
Akinyele Umoja, “Many SNCC workers depended on the protection of and were inspired 
by Black farmers like Steptoe.” Id. at  60. Another landowner and NAACP member, 
Herbert Lee, sometimes drove Moses around Amite County. A member of the state 
legislature, E.H. Hurst, murdered Lee, for his work with Moses. Id. at 63. 
30.  DANIEL, supra note 20.USDA agents not only withheld loans, they also denied 
crop allotments and a slew of other services to black farmers, while funneling money and 
offering expertise to white ones. Id. The agency also overlooked fraud and abuse in 
elections for its powerful county committees, which ensured they were dominated by white 
elites, who similarly manipulated, and often refused, acreage allotments and loans to black 
farmers and poor whites. Id. 
31.  REYNOLDS, supra note 15. 
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farmers is so thoroughly omitted from the folk history that, in 
2014, a writer for Modern Farmer claimed “there are more 
minority farmers than ever before,”32 when there were almost 
six times as many black farmers in 192033 as there were 
minority farmers—total—in the latest census.34 
 
Myth: Earl Butz Was A Pivotal Figure 
 
That Earl Butz, secretary of agriculture under Richard 
Nixon and Gerald Ford, was fired for a racist joke, may help 
explain why Michael Pollan has described him as the architect 
behind America’s industrialized food system. Many writers lead 
their accounts with remarks on Butz’s character, repeat his 
admonitions that farmers “plant fence row to fence row” and 
“get big or get out,”35 then summarize how he dismantled New 
Deal supply management systems and encouraged maximum 
production; introduced direct payments; and displaced small 
farmers.36 One group of writers argues that Nixon’s USDA, 
under Butz, was responsible for “the last fundamental shift in 
agricultural policies.”37 Butz “[helped] shift the food chain onto 
a foundation of cheap corn,” writes Pollan.38 Nestle claims that 
he “encouraged farmers to produce as much food as possible.”39 
Butz “forever transformed . . . the rural landscape once 
healthfully dotted by profitable small farms,” contends Bill 
 
32.  Andrew Jenner, 5 Things You Need to Know from the New Farm Census, MOD. 
FARMER (Feb. 20, 2014), http://modernfarmer.com/2014/02/6-things-need-know-new-
farm-census/. 
33.  REYNOLDS, supra note 15. 
34.  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., 2012 CENSUS OF 
AGRICULTURE: U.S. NATIONAL LEVEL DATA 63 tbl.61 (2014). 
35.  See, e.g., Marion Nestle, Today’s “Eat More” Environment: The Role of the 
Food Industry, in A PLACE AT THE TABLE 95, 102 (Peter Pringle ed. 2013); Tom Philpott, 
A Reflection on the Lasting Legacy of 1970s USDA Secretary Earl Butz, GRIST (Feb. 8, 
2008) http://grist.org/article/the-butz-stops-here/; MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S 
DILEMMA 51-52 (2006). 
36.  Nestle, Philpott, & POLLAN, supra note 35. 
37.  Mark Bittman, Michael Pollan, Ricardo Salvador, & Olivier De Schutter, A 
National Food Policy for the 21st Century, MEDIUM (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://medium.com/food-is-the-new-internet/a-national-food-policy-for-the-21st-century-
7d323ee7c65f. 
38.  POLLAN, supra note 35, at 51. 
39.  Marion Nestle, In Memorium: Earl Butz, FOOD POLITICS (Feb. 12, 2008), 
http://www.foodpolitics.com/2008/02/in-memorium-earl-butz/. 
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Eubanks.40 
 
Butz inaugurated almost none of the programs his critics 
say he did: they began under earlier USDA chiefs, who had 
sided with big farmers since the New Deal. Ezra Taft Benson, 
not Butz, ended production controls for corn, in 1959,41 and was 
the first to urge farmers to “get big or get out.”42 Kennedy 
severely weakened supply management with a farm bill that 
made programs voluntary for every commodity except wheat.43 
Johnson bragged that his bill would drop prices “to the lowest 
possible cost” and that he would deal with “farm surplus and 
supply management” through increased exports, which he 
expected to grow by “50 percent” in a decade.44 Johnson’s law 
also introduced direct payments to farmers, which lasted through 
the 1980s.45 
 
Butz’s farm bill was “the logical extension of the acts of 
1965 and 1970,” according to former USDA chief economist 
and Kennedy adviser Willard Cochrane.46 When that bill passed, 
monoculture had already taken hold. A series of 
contemporaneous studies found that fencerow-to-fencerow 
agriculture had been dominant in the Midwest long before Butz 
entered office.47 As Wendell Berry, who inspired Pollan’s food 
 
40.  Eubanks, supra note 7, at 225. 
41.  Richard Orr, New Methods, New Law Hike Corn Surplus, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 
1959, at 5; MILTON H. ERICKSEN & KEITH COLLINS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RES. 
SERV., EFFECTIVENESS OF ACREAGE REDUCTION PROGRAMS 167 (1985). 
42.  JAMES E. SHEROW, THE GRASSLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: AN 
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 139 (2007) 
43.  Jon Lauck, After Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of 
“Freedom to Farm,” 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 3, 17 (2000). 
44.  President Lyndon Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Food 
and Agriculture Act of 1965 (Nov. 4, 1965); see also James N. Giglio, New Frontier 
Agricultural Policy: The Commodity Side, 1961-1963, 61 AGRIC. HISTORY 53, 69 (1987) 
(“By 1965 the Johnson administration. . .focused on expanding exports as the way to deal 
with problems of farm surplus and low income.”) 
45.  Giglio, supra note 44, at 70. 
46.  WILLARD COCHRANE & MARY E. RYAN, AMERICAN FARM POLICY, 1948-1973, 
at 84 (1976). 
47.  See Robert I. Papendick, Lloyd F. Elliott, & Robert B Dahlgren, Environmental 
Consequences of Modern Production Agriculture: How Can Alternative Agriculture 
Address These Issues and Concerns?, 1 AM. J. ALT. AGRIC. 3 (1986) (summarizing early 
research on modern farming practices and wildlife habitat); Melvin Taylor, Carl Wolfe, & 
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journalism,48 writes, “Butz’s tenure in the Department of 
Agriculture, and even his influence, are matters far more 
transient than the power and values of those whose interests he 
represented.”49 
 
Myth: The Farm Crisis Began in the 1980s 
 
Journalists treat the 1980s farm crisis as if it were the 
“deepest rural crisis since the Great Depression.”50 Hollywood 
saw it that way: studios released two films about the crisis in 
1984.51 A group of musicians held the first Farm Aid concert the 
next year.52 The public believed then, as journalists report now, 
that, prior to the 1980s, even farmers “on small parcels of 
land . . . could make a reasonably good living.”53 
 
What makes this story so strange is that the decline was 
significantly slower in the 1980s than in previous decades.54 
 
William Baxter, Land-Use Change and Ring-Necked Pheasants in Nebraska, 6 WILDLIFE 
SOC’Y BULL. 226 (1978) (documenting the rapid spread of fencerow-to-fencerow 
monoculture in Nebraska after 1964); D. Russell Vance, Changes in Land Use and Wildlife 
Populations in Southeastern Illinois, 4 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 11 (1976) (finding that 
wildlife habitat had been virtually eliminated from southeastern Illinois farms by 1974). As 
the environmental and agricultural historian James Sherow put it, “the big fallout of the 
‘get big or get out’ mindset occurred during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson 
Administrations.” SHEROW, supra note 42. 
48.  Joe Fassler, The Wendell Berry Sentence that Inspired Michael Pollan’s Food 
Obsession, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2013/04/the-wendell-berry-sentence-
that-inspired-michael-pollans-food-obsession/275209/. 
49.  WENDELL BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA v (Counterpoint 1996) (1977) 
50.  Philpott, supra note 35. 
51.  These were Country and The River. Places in the Heart also came out that year, 
but was set in the Depression era. Associated Press, Lange, Spacek, Fonda: 3 Hollywood 
Actresses Relate Farmers’ Plight, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1985, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1985-05-06/news/mn-4387_1_jane-fonda. 
52.  Farm Aid: A Concert for America, FARM AID, 
https://www.farmaid.org/issues/industrial-agriculture/farm-aid-thirty-years-of-action-for-
family-farmers/ (last visited May 12, 2017). 
 53.  Siena Chrisman, Want to Understand Trump’s Rise? Head to the Farm, CIVIL 
EATS (Oct. 27, 2016), 
http://civileats.com/2016/10/27/want-to-understand-trumps-rise-head-to-the-farm/ 
54.  There was a 13.9 percent decline in white farmers from 1982 to 1992 (and only 
6.6 percent from 1982 to 1987), versus 16.2 percent from 1969 to 1978, 23.3 percent from 
1959 to 1969, and 28.7 percent from 1950 to 1959. The same general trends were evident 
for black farmers, but their rates were much higher. See REYNOLDS, supra note 15. A 2004 
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There was a difference, however: a wealthier class of farmers 
was affected. A group of sociologists who interviewed a 
representative sample of Iowa farm operators during the crisis 
found that “persons most at risk of forced displacement from 
farming are found to be younger, better educated, and large-
scale operators.”55 Wealthier farmers had been much more likely 
to take out large loans to expand their operations in the 1970s. 
As a result, when the Federal Reserve suddenly curtailed 
inflation in 1979, these farmers were hit hard by astronomical 
interest rates.56 
 
The farm crisis itself was real: families were forcibly and 
tragically displaced from their farms during the 1980s; the myth-
making begins when writers portray it as a starting point. 
Numerous families lost their farms prior to the 1980s, often at 
higher rates, yet their displacement was not perceived as a 
catastrophe, since they came from marginalized populations. By 
treating the farm crisis as an aberration, these writers conceal 
this larger tragedy and the decades of policy-making that caused 
it.  
Myth: Land Consolidation Was Inevitable 
 
Between 1930 and 1992, the number of white farmers fell 
by 65 percent and black farmers by 98 percent,57 as farms 
became larger, almost all of them owned by white men.58 
Willard Cochrane ascribes these changes to a “technological 
 
USDA study concluded “that the 1982-86 farm financial crisis did not affect exit rates 
much.” JEROME M. STAM & BRUCE L. DIXON, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH 
SERV., AIB-788, FARMER BANKRUPTCIES AND FARM EXITS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1899-
2002, at 25 (2004). 
55.  Gordon Bultena, Paul Lasley, & Jack Geller, The Farm Crisis: Patterns and 
Impacts of Financial Distress among Iowa Farm Families, 51 RURAL SOCIOLOGY, 436, 
436 (1986). 
56.  See NEAL HARL, THE FARM DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1980S 13-17 (1990), for a 
summary of the economic factors contributing to the crisis. Black and female farmers also 
struggled during the decade—between 1982 and 1987, they were 15 percent and 13 percent 
more likely to exit than whites and men, respectively—but their misfortunes were less 
visible. ROBERT A. HOPPE & PENNI KORB, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH 
SERV., ERR-21, UNDERSTANDING U.S. FARM EXITS 17 (2006). 
57.  See REYNOLDS, supra note 15. 
58.  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., 2012 CENSUS OF 
AGRICULTURE: FARM TYPOLOGY 9 tbl.1 (2015). 
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revolution”;59 Jim Chen writes that “technology inexorably 
increases farm size”;60 Laurie Ristino and Gabriela Steier 
attribute consolidation to “efficiencies of economies of scale,” 
the “adoption of tractors . . . and combines,” and “the Green 
Revolution.”61 These writers share a—sometimes unstated—
belief in autonomous technological “forces,” part of a discourse 
of technological determinism rooted in conservative ideology.62 
 
Experts agree that neither economies of scale nor 
technology give large-scale farms an edge over smaller ones.63 
In 2013, USDA researchers surveyed the literature and 
concluded that “most economists are skeptical that scale 
economies usefully explain increased farm sizes.”64 Similarly, 
technology itself does not inherently—or as the USDA 
researchers put it, “explicitly”—benefit owners of large-scale 
farms.65 What technology does is allow farmers to substitute 
capital for labor, enabling those with sufficient capital to reduce 
labor costs.66 As a result, labor-saving technology can lead to 
land consolidation when combined with policies that provide 
commercial farms with easy access to capital, while withholding 
it from smaller ones, as happened in the United States.67 
 
59.  WILLARD COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 352 
(2d ed.1993). 
60.  Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 852 (1995). 
61.  Laurie Ristino and Gabriela Steier, Losing Ground: A Clarion Call for Farm Bill 
Reform to Ensure a Food Secure Future, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59, 84 (2016). 
62.  See Shane Hamilton, Agribusiness, The Family Farm, and the Politics of 
Technological Determinism in the Post-World War II United States, 55 TECH. & CULTURE. 
560 (2014). 
63.  See, e.g., JAMES M. MCDONALD, PENNI KORB, & ROBERT A. HOPPE, U.S. DEP’T 
OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ERR-152, FARM SIZE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF 
U.S. CROP FARMING 22 (2013); Yoav Kislev & Willis Peterson, Prices, Technology, and 
Farm Size, 90 J. POL. ECON. 578, 586 (1982) (explaining that economies of scale are “not 
generally supported by the empirical record”). 
64.  MCDONALD, KORB, & HOPPE, supra note 63. 
65.  Id. at 22-23. See also Interview by Mark Snead with James MacDonald, Chief, 
Structure, Tech., & Productivity Branch, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., in Kansas City, Mo. (June 9, 
2010). 
66.  MCDONALD, KORB, & HOPPE, supra note 63, at 22-23. 
67.  As Monthly Review observed in 1956: 
What is behind this great rush to concentration and centralization in American agriculture? 
It won’t do to repeat pat phrases about science and technology. Science does not apply 
itself, and technology does not introduce itself. These are functions of individuals, groups, 
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Since before the New Deal, agricultural planners had 
advocated for consolidating farmland and mechanizing 
agriculture.68 An advisor under Eisenhower coined the term 
“agribusiness” to describe the vertically integrated, corporate 
structures policymakers hoped would come to dominate the 
production, distribution, and marketing of farm products.69 
While agribusiness proponents believed technology would force 
small farmers out of business on its own, they advanced policies 
that favored large-scale producers anyway. Then, as now, 
government policy that favored large-scale farmers forced 
modest growers out of business. 
 
Policy Makes Politics 
 
While conservatives have consistently pushed more 
aggressive, pro-agribusiness policies, liberals have often 
responded with pro-agribusiness policies of their own, even 
when that meant undermining their own natural allies: small and 
mid-sized farmers, farmworkers, rural minority populations, and 
the small, independent businesses they support. The Democrats’ 
approach to agricultural policy has been so perplexing that 
academics have developed a rich literature, in the field of policy 
feedback, to understand it. Policy feedback is the study of the 
ways, as Theda Skocpol recently described it, “in which policy 
fights and outcomes at one point in time set up, or close off, 
future possibilities.”70 
 
Researchers in policy studies have paid special attention to 
the Democrats’ relationship with the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, a conservative interest group that rose to power with 
 
and institutions; and in capitalist society they are functions that can be performed only by 
those who have the necessary capital at their disposal. 
Capitalism and Agriculture, 8 MONTHLY REV. 1, 6 (1956). 
68.  See DANIEL, supra note 20, at 9-10. 
69.  HAMILTON, supra note 62, at 560-561. 
70.  Theda Skocpol, A Guide to Rebuilding the Democratic Party, from the Ground 
Up, VOX (Jan. 5., 2017), 
http://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/5/14176156/rebuild-democratic-party-dnc-
strategy. 
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federal help.71 The Farm Bureau “grew out of the movement for 
improved farming methods,” pushed by businessmen, scientists, 
and, “especially,” USDA.72 The group “eagerly recruited 
commercial farmers” and was “not at all inclined to expand 
beyond that constituency.”73 From the beginning it styled itself 
as a bulwark against government intervention and leftist 
populism: James Howard, the first president of the Farm Bureau, 
claimed that he stood “as a rock against radicalism.” 74 
 
As New Deal negotiations began, the Farm Bureau pursued 
the interests of white, Southern planters, and liberals made 
significant concessions to them, out of expediency. One of the 
most significant was “predominant influence” over the 
administration of the AAA, which the Farm Bureau used to 
favor large producers and consolidate its power. The group’s 
membership increased six-fold between 1933 and 1945, as it 
lobbied for large growers at the expense of smaller farmers.75 As 
Mancur Olson concluded in his widely cited study of interest 
groups, “the Farm Bureau was created by the government.”76 
 
From that point on, the Farm Bureau played an expanding 
role in farm policy, using its increasing power to not only push 
out small farmers but to oppose progressive legislation at every 
opportunity. The Farm Bureau, among other things, helped pass 
 
71.  See, e.g., KENNETH FINEGOLD & THEDA SKOCPOL, STATE AND PARTY IN 
AMERICA’S NEW DEAL (1995); THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND 
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979); GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (2d ed. 1971). The political scientist Paul Pierson notes in his classic work on 
policy feedback, When Effect Becomes Cause, “The Farm Bureau’s development has been 
widely linked to policy feedback, even by scholars not inclined to emphasize the 
independent role of government activity.” Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause, 45 
WORLD POL. 595, 600 n.5 (1993). 
72.  Brody, supra note 5, at 146. 
73.  Id. at 160. 
74.  SAMUEL R. BERGER, DOLLAR HARVEST 93 (1971). David F. Houston, secretary 
of agriculture under Wilson, urged farmers to join local chapters, where they could fight to 
“stop bolshevism.” Id. 
75.  Robert L. Tantz, Membership of General Farmers’ Organizations, United States, 
1874-1960 38 AGRIC. HIST. 143, 147 tbl.1 (1964). 
76.  OLSON, supra note 71, at 149. 
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the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,77 sought to repeal the 
federal income tax in the 1950s,78 bitterly fought Medicare in 
the 1960s,79 opposed the Equal Rights Amendment in the 
1980s,80 lobbied against health care reform in the 1990s,81 and 
boasted of killing the Waxman-Markey climate bill during 
Obama’s first term.82 Today, the Farm Bureau continues to 
oppose a wide swathe of progressive legislation,83 as do its state 
branches, which often hold conservative positions on social 
issues such as abortion, gay rights, and medical marijuana.84 
Nonetheless, Tom Vilsack, secretary of agriculture under 
Obama, is a member of the Farm Bureau and repeatedly spoke at 
its annual conference during his term.85 His commitment went 
beyond words: Vilsack pushed the rapid growth of the federal 
 
77.  SHEILA D. COLLINS & GERTRUDE SCHAFFNER GOLDBERG, WHEN 
GOVERNMENT HELPED 133 (2013). 
78.  Berger, supra note 74, at 150. 
79.  Id. at 173. 
80.  Letter from John C. Datt, Dir., American Farm Bureau Federation Washington 
Office, to Senator Orrin Hatch (May 20, 1983) (on file with authors). 
81.  Richard Orr, 18% of Rural America Has Little or No Health Insurance, USDA 
Says, CHI. TRIB., FEB. 7, 1994. 
82.  CHRIS CLAYTON, THE ELEPHANT IN THE CORNFIELD: THE POLITICS OF 
AGRICULTURE AND CLIMATE CHANGE loc. 59 (2015) (ebook). 
83.  The Farm Bureau’s 2016 list of policy resolutions ran longer than 200 pages and 
expressed, among other conservative positions, the organization’s opposition to Medicare 
expansion, universal health care, government-funded high-speed rail, “efforts to remove 
references to Christmas,” gay marriage, and “special privileges to those that participate in 
alternative lifestyles.” AMER. FARM BUREAU FED’N, FARM BUREAU POLICIES FOR 2016, at 
16, 33, 35-36, 40 (2016). 
84.  The Missouri Farm Bureau declared in 2017, inter alia, its opposition to the use 
of “religious legal code”—a euphemistic phrase for Sharia law—in American courts, more 
stringent gun control laws, and a federal minimum wage, while supporting “right-to-work” 
legislation, harsher penalties for drug infractions, and a constitutional amendment requiring 
a balanced federal budget. MO. FARM BUREAU, 2017 POLICY BOOK: FACING THE ISSUES 
76-79, 81, 87 (2017). See also Joseph Gerth, Dozens Protest as Farm Bureau Defends 
Stance, COURIER-J., Aug. 25, 2016 (describing protests against the Kentucky Farm Bureau 
for its “stance on issues including gay rights, union rights, and abortion rights”); Arkansans 
Against Legalized Marijuana, ARK. FARM BUREAU (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.arfb.com/news/2016/aug/31/podcast-arkansans-against-legalized-marijuana/ 
(advocating against a medical marijuana ballot initiative). 
85.  E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Remarks of Agriculture Secretary Tom 
Vilsack to 94th Annual Meeting of the Farm Bureau Federation (Jan. 14, 2013) (on file with 
authors); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack Addresses 
American Farm Bureau Convention (Jan. 13, 2014) (on file with authors); Press Release, 
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, A Conversation with Tom and Bob: Farm Bureau Town Hall 
Meeting (Jan. 11, 2015) (on file with authors). 
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crop insurance program,86 which sends millions of dollars to the 
Farm Bureau each year,87 while hurting smaller farms and the 
environment.88 
 
Vilsack is one in a line of Democratic politicians that have 
supported conservative policies that undermine their own party. 
Democrats must develop and articulate an alternative—and 
progressive—rural policy. Rather than funneling cash to large-
scale farmers and corporations, Democrats should support 
workers and small-scale businesses. Rather than displacing poor 
and marginalized rural people, the party must empower them. 
As history has shown, to do otherwise would not only be 
disastrous for the party, but for the nation as a whole. 
 
 
86.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Remarks of Agriculture Secretary 
Tom Vilsack to 94th Annual Meeting of the Farm Bureau Federation (Jan. 14, 2013) (on 
file with authors) (statement of Secretary Vilsack) (“[The farm] bill must start with the 
commitment . . .[to] a strong and viable crop insurance program. . . .”); Press Release, Nat’l 
Crop Ins. Serv., USDA Secretary Kicks off International Crop Insurance Conference (Sept. 
28, 2015) (on file with authors); O. Kay Henderson, Departing Vilsack Offering Farm Bill 
Suggestions, RADIO IOWA, Jan. 2, 2017 (“Vilsack is urging groups in the farm sector to be 
more vocal advocates of federal crop insurance subsidiesFalse”) 
87.  See, e.g., FOOD & WATER WATCH, THE FARM BUREAU’S BILLIONS: THE VOICE 
OF FARMERS OR AGRIBUSINESS? 2 (2010), 
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/farm_bureau_billions_fs_july_2010.
pdf; Ian T. Shearn, Whose Side is the American Farm Bureau On?, THE NATION (July 16, 
2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/whose-side-american-farm-bureau/; LAND 
STEWARDSHIP PROJECT, CROP INSURANCE—HOW A SAFETY NET BECAME A FARM 
POLICY DISASTER (2014). 
88.  See, e.g., MICHAEL DUFFY, CTR. FOR RURAL AFF., IMPACT OF CROP INSURANCE 
ON LAND VALUES (2016); ANNA WEIR SCHECHINGER & CRAIG COX, IS FEDERAL CROP 
INSURANCE LEADING TO ANOTHER DUST BOWL? (2017); Anna Weir Schechinger, How 
Crop Insurance Makes Landowners and Big Growers Grow Richer—And Hurts Other 
Farmers, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP: AGMAG (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://www.ewg.org/agmag/2016/04/how-crop-insurance-makes-landowners-and-big-
growers-richer-and-hurts-other-farmers; LAND STEWARDSHIP PROJECT, CROP INSURANCE 
ENSURES THE BIG GET BIGGER (2014); DANIEL SUMNER & CARL ZULAUF, COUNCIL ON 
FOOD, AGRIC. & RES. ECON., ECONOMIC & ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF 
AGRICULTURAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS (2012). 
